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This dissertation examines innovation incentives and intellectual prop-
erty rights within corporations. In the first chapter, I outline the contribution
and summarize the existing literature about intellectual property rights, em-
ployee outside options, and innovation incentives. The effects of intellectual
property rights are important to understand as our modern economy leans
more on heavily on new ideas generated by the brightest minds. By connect-
ing intellectual property rights with employee outside options, I am able to
root this dissertation in the existing theory.
In the second chapter, I present and analyze a model of innovation
investment where firm investment and employee efforts are complements. The
main empirical prediction from this model is that total innovation production
can increase when employee rights decline. This prediction holds on for firms
vi
where employee rights are high to begin with. This model also sheds light on
additional testable predictions about firm investment, financial constraints,
and employee-firm matching. While previous models have highlighted how
employee outside options impact employee incentives, this model generates
slightly different predictions by incorporating the firm’s investment decision.
In the third chapter, I study how decreasing employee rights can affect
corporate innovation. First, I discuss the legal environment surrounding the
restriction of employee rights. In particular I focus on the Inevitable Disclo-
sure Doctrine, which is a legal doctrine though which an employer can use
trade secret protection to enjoin a former employee from working in a job that
may result in the use of trade secrets without the need for proof or evidence.
Next, I empirically examine how state adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure
Doctrine affects innovation. Using several patent driven proxies for firm in-
novation, I find that high tech firms located in states affected increase their
innovation activity compared to low tech firms in the same location and high
tech firms located in non affected states. I show that this affect is associated
with increases in R& D spending and is stronger when the firm is not finan-
cially constrained. I also show that talented employees join high tech firms in
affected locations. This is the first paper to highlight how complementarity
between firm and employees can lead to increased innovation when employee
outside options decrease.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1
Overview
Economists have made important strides in understanding the factors
that influence innovative activity within corporations. Innovation success has
been linked to financial structure, competitive environment, and managerial
compensation. However, the literature has largely treated the innovation pro-
cess itself as a black box, abstracting away from the collaborative efforts of
employees and firms that ultimately drive the development of new products,
designs, and processes. This omission is significant, as it masks the potentially
important role of incentives to invest time, effort, and financial resources in
the innovation process.
New innovations are inherently difficult to describe ex ante and verify
ex post. As a result, conventional solutions that provide incentives to innovate
1
are difficult to achieve (Aghion and Tirole, 1994). Instead, a party’s incentives
to invest in innovation depend primarily on how successful innovation affects
the value of its outside options, as in the standard incomplete contracting
framework of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). This
paper empirically investigates how incentives arising from outside options im-
pact corporate innovation by exploiting a series of shocks to employees’ outside
options – state-level adoptions of the “Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine” (IDD).
The doctrine increases trade secret protections by allowing firms to enforce
restrictions on the ability of employees who know important trade secrets to
leave and compete against the firm. This doctrine effectively constrains the
outside options of employees involved in innovation by limiting their ability to
depart with innovative knowledge.1
To provide a formal framework for understanding how these changes
should affect innovation, I present a simple model of investment in innova-
tion. In the model, a firm and employee contribute complementary innovative
inputs, reflecting the idea that the most successful corporate innovations are
achieved by combining employee ingenuity with firm resources. The employee
acquires knowledge in the process of successful innovation that increases the
value of her outside options, perhaps by making her more worthy to other
employers or by improving her prospects as an entrepreneur. The departure
of the employee and the resulting loss of her knowledge decreases the value of
the innovation to the firm to the point where it is willing to match the value
1See Section 2 for a more detailed description of IDD.
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of her outside option in order to retain her.2
The direct consequence of tightening constraints on the ability of the
employee to depart with valuable knowledge is an increase in the firm’s and a
decrease in the employee’s return from innovation and, as a result, a change
in innovation incentives. Moreover, additional firm investment in innovation
increases the returns to the employee’s inputs because of investment comple-
mentaries, which strengthens the employee’s incentives to innovate. The net
effect of these changes in incentives results in an inverted U-shaped relationship
between innovation activity and the ability of employees to leave with innova-
tive knowledge. Additionally, because innovation inputs are complementary,
more talented employees may match to firms with tougher protections against
employee knowledge expropriation.
Motivated by these insights, I examine changes in patents and patent
citations – measures of innovative output – after IDD adoption. Relying on
IDD adoption as a shock to outside options is useful for three reasons. First,
it allows me to circumvent the need to precisely measure the level of and
changes to employee outside options. Second, even if outside options could be
measured, concerns about omitted variables and reverse causality would make
it difficult to make causal inferences about any observed relationship between
innovative output and measures of outside options.3 Focusing on shocks that
2“Did you realize that approximately 42% of the average company’s intellectual capital
exists only within its employees’ heads?” - Thomas Brailsford
3For example, more innovative firms may attract more intrinsically-motivated employees,
and hence do not need to provide strong incentives like the ability transfer knowledge.
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are plausibly exogenous with respect to innovation allows me to make stronger
inferences. Third, the use of staggered state-level shocks allows me to control
for a number of potentially contaminating factors, including unobserved time-
varying firm characteristics.
I implement my empirical analysis by examining patents and patent ci-
tations three years before and after adoption IDD adoptions. In particular, my
empirical strategy focuses on comparing changes in innovative activity around
these shocks between high technology firms, where employees can take more
valuable knowledge if they depart, and low technology firms, where they have
less knowledge to take. The model’s chief prediction implies that innovative
activity should increase after IDD adoption in high technology firms relative
to low technology firms. Consistent with this prediction, after IDD adoption,
both patents and citations increase by 9 - 15% in high technology firm estab-
lishments in states affected by IDD adoption relative to low technology firm
establishments.
One concern with this approach is that IDD adoption could be related
to characteristics of firms in the adopting state. For example, a state court may
be more inclined to adopt IDD when the state has more innovative companies
that are likely to benefit from and push for these protections. However, this
concern is partially mitigated by the fact that IDD adoption is the result of
state court decisions rather than legislative actions, assuming that the latter
Alternatively, as firms in an industry invest more in innovation, innovative employees become
more mobile and their ability to transfer knowledge increases.
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are more likely to be influenced by lobbying efforts. In any case, to further
address this concern, I exploit the fact that firms often innovate in different
states, and I use these unaffected establishments to account for any unobserved
firm-level difference in and changes to technology, financial constraints, or
firm operations within each year. Specifically, I estimate triple-differences
regressions comparing innovative output (1) across establishments in adopting
and non-adopting states, (2) before and after IDD adoption years, and (3)
between high and low technology firms. This approach allows me to filter
out the effects of any time-varying firm-level variables that may be correlated
with innovation outcomes that could complicate inference, such as firm-wide
investment increases or changes in the incentives to patent innovation. Even
after controlling for these time-varying firm-level factors, patents and citations
increase by 9 - 21% after IDD adoption in high technology establishments
relative to low technology establishments.
Next, I focus on firm investment in innovation4. The model demon-
strates that a firm can only achieve more innovation after a weakening of
employee outside options if the firm increases investment in innovation. Con-
sistent with this response, I find that high technology firms increase R&D in-
vestment spending after IDD adoption.5 Furthermore, the ability to increase
investment also depends on the firm’s financial strength. To this end, I proxy
for the ease of increasing innovation investment by using ex ante firm leverage,
4See Hall and Harhoff (2012) for survey on financing R&D.
5This result is similar to Png (2015), who finds that high technology firms increase R&D
investment after passage of the UTSA.
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the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, the Whited and Wu (2006) index, and
the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) and separately examine changes in
innovation in firms that are more or less likely to be financially constrained
using the same triple-differences set up. In firms that are less likely to be
constrained, the effect of IDD adoption on high tech firms is positive and sig-
nificant, while no such change is observed for firms that are more likely to be
constrained.6
Finally, I examine how the ability of firms to attract and hire employees
changes around IDD adoptions. One might expect that IDD protections would
make it more difficult for a firm to attract talented employees because the firm
keeps a greater share of the gains from innovation. However, I demonstrate in
an extension of my model that talented employees may match to firms with
stricter protections in equilibrium. Since talented employees are inherently
more productive, they will provide more effort in response to increases in firm
investment in innovation, and, thus, experience a greater benefit as a result. I
measure the fraction of new inventors at an establishment and identify highly
skilled employees as inventors who have previously published a highly cited
patent.7 I then examine changes in the fraction of total, skilled, and unskilled
new hires in the triple-differences framework. Consistent with IDD adoption
enhancing a firm’s ability to hire more talented employees, high technology
6Changes to patent and trade secret protections can impact the pledgeability of intangible
assets (Klasa et al. (2015) and Mann (2015)). However, IDD adoption is unlikely to influence
innovation more in constrained firms.
7I identify firm new comers using the same methodology as Bernstein (2015).
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firms hire 2% more highly skilled inventors each year after IDD adoption.
The main identification strategy in this paper uses state-level shocks
in a triple-differences setting. Even though this strategy controls for a mul-
titude of factors, there could be other sources of endogenous variation that
are unaccounted for. First, other state-level changes favorable to innovation
might occur around IDD adoption. To address this concern, I form a matched
sample using small, private firms in states affected by IDD, which should be
affected by state innovation incentives but less affected by employee-employer
frictions. I confirm that the results hold when using these synthetic controls.
Second, trade secret protections could shift incentives to patent innovations.
Kim and Marschke (2005) argue that firms with high employee mobility pre-
fer to use patents, not trade secrets, to better protect ideas from employee
expropriation. Therefore, IDD should have a negative impact on patenting at
high technology firms, where mobility is high, relative to low technology firms.
Since I document that high technology firms increase patenting relative to low
technology firms, the effect I identify on patented innovations is likely to be a
lower bound for the effect of IDD on total innovation8.
8See Hall and Lerner (2010) for survey about the economics of patents.
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1.2
Literature
Many academics and policy makers have highlighted the importance of
innovation. However, there has been considerable debate in how to protect
firm interests and employees rights when it comes to intellectual property and
innovation. Most of this debate centers around the ability of firms to prevent
their employees from joining competitors. Recently, the House (2016) weighed
in with a executive summary and policy directives aimed at non competes. In
this area of research, Garmaise (2009) finds that CEOs decrease investment
spending when non-compete enforcement increases because CEOs value their
human capital less. However, Jeffers (2016) finds that non-compete enforce-
ment leads to increased firm investment at the employee level because the firm
can more easily capitalize on firm specific human capital that is developed.
Also, Marx et al. (2009) and Jeffers (2016) both find that non-competes favor
existing companies at the expense of new entrepreneurial ventures. This paper
adds to the understanding of limiting employee outside options by detailing
which types of investments, firms, and employees might benefit most from
decreasing employee outside options.
This paper is related to a larger literature which looks at labor laws,
employee incentives and innovation. Acharya et al. (2013, 2014) find that
wrongful discharge laws reduce employer hold up and can increase innovation.
Griffith and Macartney (2014) link employment protections to more radical
8
innovations. Also, Bradley et al. (2015) look at the impact of unions on em-
ployee protection and misaligned effort incentives. Both Klasa et al. (2015)
and Png and Samila (2015) document that highly skilled and highly educated
employees have an outsized reduction in mobility after states adopt IDD, which
can impact corporate decisions like firm leverage. This paper adds to the lit-
erature by connecting changes in employee outside options to firm investment
and provides evidence that decreasing employee outside options can improve
innovation outcomes.
This paper also contributes to the literature on incomplete contracts
and management of R&D. Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990) illustrate the insight that bilateral relationships suffer from hold up
problems. In this spirit, Aghion and Tirole (1994) and Tirole (1999) study the
integration decisions of R&D units, Almazan et al. (2007) study firm location
decisions and the development of human capital, and Fulghieri and Sevilir
(2011) study worker incentives and merger-spinoff decisions. My model builds
on the intuition in these models and focuses on incentives problems caused by
incomplete contract within the firm. Furthermore, my paper provides empir-
ical support that incomplete contracting mechanisms have significant effects
on firm dynamics.
This paper also contributes to the recent literature on corporate in-
novation. Several studies have documented how different corporate decisions
and characteristics can lead to changes in innovation such as IPOs (Bernstein,
2015), corporate conglomeration (Seru, 2014), hostile takeovers (Atanassov,
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2013), mergers and acquisitions (Bena and Li, 2014), financial constraints
(Almeida et al., 2013), corporate governance (Sapra et al., 2014) and compe-
tition (Grieser and Liu, 2016). Also, other institutional factors like banking
deregulation (Chava et al., 2013; Cornaggia et al., 2015), analyst coverage (He
and Tian, 2013), stock liquidity (Fang et al., 2014), litigation costs Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2004), and corporate venture capital (Chemmanur et al.,
2014) have been linked to innovation. In addition, innovation has been linked
to CEO and board of directors factors like incentive pay (Ederer and Manso,
2013), tolerance for failure (Manso, 2011; Tian and Wang, 2014), and board
independence (Balsmeier et al., 2015). My paper adds to this literature by
directly studying the employee-employer relationship and considering how to
provide incentives to both parties.
10
Chapter 2
Model of Innovation Incentives
In this chapter, I analyze a model of investment in innovation. I emphasize
how effort and investment decisions of an employee and firm differ with the
employee’s outside options. The employee’s outside options affect the alloca-
tion of gains from innovation between the two parties. This model motivates
the regressions I run in Chapter 3.
2.1
Setup
The model consists of a firm (F), an employee (E), and one joint inno-
vation project. The timeline of decisions is given in Figure 2.1. At t = 0, the
firm hires an employee and invests I in the project. At t = 1, upon observing
the firm’s investment in the project, the employee chooses her level of effort,
e, which is observable but not verifiable. Also, effort has a quadratic disutility
11
Figure 2.1: Model Timeline
T = 0
Firm set I
T = 1
Employee chooses e
T = 2
Innovation eIα
Split by Firm & Employee
cost, c(e) = e
2
2
. Thus, the total returns to the project can be expressed as:
R = eIα, where α < 1
2
is the output elasticity of the investment. At t = 2,
after the output is realized, the firm pays the employee. The employee has no
resources and is protected by limited liability. The firm and employee are also
risk neutral.
2.2
Frictionless Benchmark
The frictionless benchmark for this model is a self-funded entrepreneur
who decides how much capital to invest and how much effort to put into
the project. The entrepreneur maximizes eIα − c e2
2
− I. Taking first order
conditions with respect to effort and investment and solving analytically yields
the following solutions:1
1I take the second order conditions to verify that this solution is a local maximum.
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IFB = α
1
1−2α , eFB =
IFBα
c
=
α
α
1−2α
c
. (2.1)
Furthermore, the total expected output in the scenario can be solved
analytically.
Total InnovationFB = eFBIFB =
α
2α
1−2α
c
. (2.2)
2.3
Firm-Employee Model
If firm investment and employee effort are made by separate parties, the
division of ex post surplus will be important to investment decisions. Again,
the firm invests at t = 0 and the employee invests at t = 1.
At t = 2, project output is realized, but is not verifiable. Since the
output is innovation, it is difficult to describe ex ante and not verifiable ex post
in court. Furthermore, I assume that employee investment is observable. Thus,
complete contracts are not available. Also, unlike innovation contracts between
firms, there are no productive assets in innovation. One potential protection
is a patent, but patents only convey partial ownership of intellectual property.
This is because there is other valuable information such as the designs that did
not work, the future prospects, and potential improvements that are discovered
in the innovation process. I will refer to the employee’s knowledge of these
13
ideas as her inalienable human capital that is developed during the innovation
process.
The employee’s outside option is δIα, which represents her outside op-
tion – the ability to depart the firm with valuable knowledge about the firm’s
innovation. The firm must match the employee’s outside option which leaves
leaves (1 − δ)Iα for the firm.2 Thus, the payoffs are δeIα and (1 − δ)eIα for
the employee and the firm, respectively. The employee and firm maximization
functions are given below.
UE = max
e
{δ × e× Iα − ce
2
2
},
UF = max
I
{(1− δ)× e× Iα − I}.
(2.3)
2.4
Incompleteness of Contracts
I assume that project cash flows and the employee’s effort are observ-
able but not verifiable ex ante. At t = 0, contracts between the firm and the
employee cannot fully detail all possible contingencies that might occur – a sit-
uation that Tirole (1999) labels ‘indescribable contingencies.’ This assumption
is logical in this context as innovation is the process of discovering new ideas
2This assumes that there is no deadweight loss if the employee leaves. If one adds
deadweight loss and assumes the firm and the employee will share it according to their
bargaining power, the model conclusions will be not be affected.
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and designs. Given this, the firm and the employee cannot write contracts
that depend the specific details of the innovation’s value or of different signals
of employee effort. Additionally, at t = 0, the two parties cannot commit to
a contract that would not be renegotiated at time = 2 after the innovation
occurs. Since the innovation to be delivered is not specified by contract, both
the firm and the employee could be better off by holding up the other party
for more payment.
In particular, I assume that the split of innovation profits between the
firm and the employee is determined by the ability of the employee to leave
the firm. The model take the parameter that determines the employee spit
as exogeneous. This ability depends on both the legal environment and the
industry. In industries where processes and designs need to be reinvented
constantly, more power resides with the employee who has knowledge about
the processes and products that are likely (or unlikely) to succeed. Also, courts
can restrict (or encourage) the mobility of employees and the ability to take
ideas to new firms. These factors jointly determine the employee’s outside
options.
2.5
Solution
I solve this model backwards by starting from the employee’s effort
decision. At t = 1, the employee can observe the firm’s investment. The
15
employee trades off increased likelihood of success with the quadratic cost of
effort. The optimal effort of the employee is
e∗(I) =
δIα
c
. (2.4)
Next, I can solve for the firm’s investment, I, as the firm tries to max-
imize the NPV of the investment. I assume the firm is unconstrained and
can finance investment at zero marginal cost. Since investment has decreas-
ing marginal returns, it will be bounded. Taking the employee’s effort as a
function of firm investment, I can analytically solve for the optimal investment
level of the firm. 3
I∗ =
(
2αδ(1− δ)
c
) 1
1−2α
. (2.5)
Furthermore, I can plug optimal investment into the employee’s optimal
effort and derive the analytic solution for employee effort and expected returns.
e∗(I∗) = δI∗ =
δ
c
(
2αδ(1− δ)
c
) α
1−2α
. (2.6)
Total Innovation∗ = e× Iα = δ
c
(
2αδ(1− δ)
c
) 2α
1−2α
. (2.7)
Comparing these values to Equation 2.1, firm’s investment and em-
ployee’s effort are lower than first best. Since the surplus created is split by
3Note that I∗ < 1 because 2α < 1, (1− δ) ∗ δ) < 1, and 11−2α > 0. This will also imply
that e∗ < 1.
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two parties, each party will underinvest. This follows from the intuition of
Hart and Moore (1990) who show that complementary assets should be owned
together.
The equilibrium levels of total innovation, firm investment, and em-
ployee effort are plotted against employee outside options in Figure 2.2. The
intuition for the inverted U shaped relationship is as follows. When employee
outside options are very low, the employee will not exert effort. Therefore, the
firm’s investment returns are low and total innovation is not very high. On
the other end, when employee outside options are very high, the firm will not
want to invest much. Thus, returns to employee effort are not high and total
innovation will be low. The two extremes represent the dual hold up problem.
17
Figure 2.2: Total Innovation, Investment and effort
This figure plots the analytic solutions for total innovation, firm investment,
and employee effort as a function of the employee’s outside option, δ. For
these plots, the parameters α and c are set to 1
3
and 1 respectively.
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2.6
Results
Proposition 1. The relationship between employee outside options and ex-
pected project returns is not monotonic:
d Total Innovation∗
dδ
< 0, if δ > δ and
d Total Innovation∗
dδ
> 0, if δ < δ
(2.8)
Appendix A.1 provides the proof and the equation that determines δ.
The returns of the project are determined by the complementary investments of
the employee and the firm. When employee outside options are large, the firm
is not investing as much and has a higher marginal impact on total innovation.
Therefore, total innovation will increase if innovation allocation shifts from the
employee to the firm.
This model also provides other implications related to firm investment
when employee allocation decreases. If total innovation increases when inno-
vation allocation shifts from the employee to the firm, then the firm must be
investing more in the project. Clearly, when employee allocation decreases
and the firm does not change investment, the employee has weaker investment
incentives. Thus, gains in innovation must be due to firm investment which
increases project returns and catalyzes employee effort. These ideas can be
captured by the following corollaries.
19
Corollary 1. Firm investment must increase if a decline in employee outside
options leads to increases in expected project returns.
dI∗
d(−δ) < 0, if δ > δ. (2.9)
Corollary 2. If firm investment is fixed, decreasing employee outside options
leads to a decrease in expected project returns.
d Total Innovation(e∗(I), I)
d(−δ) |I=I¯ < 0. (2.10)
Appendix A.2 provides the proofs for these corollaries.
2.7
Employee Ownership and Investment
In the firm-employee model, I assume that the firm does not offer a
project dependent payoff, like an equity stake in the project, to the employee
at time 0, or allow the employee to participate in the investment. For most
public firms, any individual employee’s contribution to the firm will unlikely
have significant impact on the stock price of the firm thus owning firm stock
will not impact employee effort. Additionally, public firm employees rely on
firm investment for their projects.
However, these assumptions are less likely to hold for smaller private
companies. For many small private companies, lead engineers and scientists
20
are granted equity in the firm and the employee’s productivity directly impacts
the firm’s value. Also, many times key employees are brought in as partners
in the firm who invest their own capital into the company. In this section,
I consider how employee ownership and employee investment should impact
innovation incentives..
First, I will consider how an equity stake will affect the employee’s effort
decision. The employee’s utility will depend on her share of the innovation and
also her share of the firm’s payouts. Taking the firm’s investment as given the
employee’s utility will look like the following.
UE = max
e
{δ × e× Iα − ce
2
2
+ β ((1− δ)e× Iα − I)}, (2.11)
where β is the employee’s ownership stake of the project. Taking first
order conditions, the employee’s optimal effort is e∗ = (β(1−δ)+δ)∗I
α
c
. The firm’s
investment choice is the same as it is before. Appendix A.3 provides the proof
and the analytic solution for the firm’s investment.
There are several main differences between the employee ownership
effort results and the zero ownership case. First, we notice that optimal effort
is greater. Since the employee shares in the profit of the firm, it is clear that
the employee will invest more effort in the project. For low levels of employee
outside option, employee ownership effectively reduces the firms ability to
hold up the employee and leads to more aligned incentives. This dampens the
impact changes in outside options have on innovation, investment and effort.
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However, for high levels of employee outside options, the employee hold up
problem is exasperated as the employee essentially gains more hold up power
over the firm. In this area, changes in employee outside options are magnified.
It is intuitive that employee ownership can help align incentives when
employee outside options are low. However, it also clear that employee owner-
ship are not as effective in encouraging firm investment when employee outside
options are high.
Another possible ownership structure is a partnership between the em-
ployee and the firm. In a partnership, the employee shares the firm’s invest-
ment costs and cash flows. In the model, I allow the employee to invest, γ > 0,
in the project. Essentially, the employee invest all that she can invest and then
the firm steps in to provide additional funding if it is in the manager’s interest.
UE = max
e
{δ × e× (I + γ)α − ce
2
2
− γ},
UF = max
I
{(1− δ)× e× (I + γ)α − I},
(2.12)
The analytic solutions to this setup are provided in the appendix.
There are several differences between this case and the zero ownership
benchmark. Focusing on cases where employee outside options are high, em-
ployee investment helps motivate firm investment. Previously, total innovation
was hampered by the hold up power of the employee and thus the firm’s was
minimal. However, when the employee invests, this increases the marginal
return of the firm and the total innovation. Again, in this scenario, the effect
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of outside options is damped due to the employee’s investment.
Since private firms have other tools at their disposal, changes in em-
ployee outside options will have less impact on total innovation.
Proposition 2. Private firms will be less responsive to changes in employee
outside options than public firms.
2.8
Employee Matching
So far the model has assumed that there is a representative employee
the firm can hire. However, a more realistic assumption is that employees differ
in ability or skill. One way to model their differences is to vary the disutility
of effort by employee skill, where the highest skilled employees would have the
lowest disutility of effort.
Proposition 3. If employee outside options are high, there will be a negative
assortative match between skill and outside options.
∂2Uemp(c, δ)
∂c ∂(δ)
< 0 if δ > δˆ. (2.13)
Appendix A.3 provides the proof that shows that employee utility is
supermodular in disutility of effort and employee outside options. When em-
ployee outside options are high, there will be a negative assortative match
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between employee outside options and skill (or positive assortative match be-
tween employee outside options and disutility of effort). Intuitively, when em-
ployee outside options are high, the firm is reluctant to invest and relatively
lower employee outside options are associated with more investment. Thus,
the skilled employee, who is more willing to increase effort, would match with
the firms that provide more investment. This is similar to the intuition of Sat-
tinger (1980) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) where worker skill and capital
investment are complements.
2.9
Discussion
The key parameter of my model is δ, the degree of employee outside op-
tions. In the literature, several papers have documented how firms strategically
choose their location, debt level, or patenting propensity to limit the options
of their employees (Almazan et al., 2007; Matsa, 2010; Kim and Marschke,
2005). However, the previous arguments are not as strong in the context of
innovation, which requires high human capital employees working on specific
projects. First, mobility is higher for high human capital employees over-
all. Hence, firm location will only weakly affect bargaining power. Second,
each innovative project typically represents a small fraction of overall firm
value. Therefore, the threat of bankruptcy is not credible because it is un-
likely that the firm’s success relies on the particular project. The third point
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about patent propensity is a relevant concern that I will attempt to address
by looking within and across firms.
The most interesting results from the model are when employees can
easily depart with valuable knowledge. However, if it is easy for employees
to give up these rights, then the assumption of exogeneity is invalid. One
might think that employees can sign non-competes with their employer to
try to achieve this. In reality, the enforcement of non-competes is set by
the state courts and the employee and employer treat this as a exogenous
parameter. There is very little ability to tailor employee contracts that differ
in their treatment of employee mobility. Thus, to identify how mobility and
knowledge of employees affect innovation and investment, I study how shocks
to the ease of departing the firm and compare there effects across firms with
heterogeneous knowledge.
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Chapter 3
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and
Empirical Analysis
In this chapter, I empirically investigate the relationship between employee
outside options and innovation. There is legal ambiguity when it comes to
protecting intellectual property from employee misappropriation. This issue
rests at the intersection of Intellectual Property law and Labor/Employment
Law. On one hand, ideas can be property of the firm and should be pro-
tected against employee negligence and harmful misappropriation. On the
other hand, ideas are inseparable from individuals and should not be used to
enable involuntary servitude. Individual states differ on their opinions toward
protecting intellectual property. In this paper, I use state supreme court adop-
tion of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, which decreases employee mobility,
as an exogeneous shock to employee outside options.
First, I will describe the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and give an
example of how it is applied. Second, I will outline the data that I use in this
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study. Third, I will specify the empirical strategy and present the findings of
this study.
3.1
Trade Secrets and Inevitable Disclosure Doc-
trine
For many firms, the human capital of their employees represents a large
fraction of company value, but it is an input which the company does not
fully own. To help protect human capital, research, and new technologies,
firms often use trade secrets laws. For example, Intel and Broadcom settled
a lawsuit in 2000 that challenged the ability of employees to change jobs at
will. At the heart of the dispute was that Intel wanted to prevent employees
from joining Broadcom merely because of the threat that they might violate
Intel’s trade secrets. This is the exact issue the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
addresses.
The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) holds that in certain circum-
stances, if an employee holds critical information about firm trade secrets, she
can be temporarily (or even permanently) denied from working in a specific
job, because doing so would inevitably lead to the disclosure of her former
firm’s trade secrets. While there are many definitions of trade secrets the
main components that comprise a trade secret are (1) information (2) that
is valuable because of its secrecy, and (3) whose owner reasonably tries to
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maintain that secrecy. The law protects trade secrets from two main forms
of misappropriation: improper means and disclosure. Improper means usually
ranges from an employee copying confidential records to industrial espionage.
However, each state sets its own laws governing trade secrets, thus IDD is not
uniformly accepted by all states.
In general, IDD allows courts to prevent an employee from working for
his employer’s competitors because of the threat of misappropriation. The
firm needs to prove that the trade secret is valuable and that it has gone to
adequate lengths to keep it secret. Also, the firm needs to show that to succeed
in the employee’s new role she will rely on the former employer’s trade secrets.
If these conditions are met, the court can rule to temporarily or permanently
ban the employee from joining a competitor.
Table 3.1 provides a list of cases when IDD was first approved by a state
supreme court (Kahnke et al., 2008). Figure ?? visually plots which states have
adopted IDD. Panel A shows the relevant states where state courts adopted
IDD between 1989 and 2000. Panel B shows the states which adopted IDD
prior to 1989.
To better understand how IDD is applied, I summarize a court case in
Utah.
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3.1.1
Case: Norvell Inc. vs Timpanogos Research Group Inc.
Timpanogos Research Group (TRG), a company formed by a group of
former Norvell Inc. employees, tried to sell intellectual property to Microsoft.
However, Norvell sued TRG alleging that the intellectual property in question
comprises Norvell trade secrets obtained by former employees Darren Major,
Larry Angus, and Jeff Merkey. Norvell claimed that the ideas, designs, and
templates shown to Microsoft were created at Norvell and, therefore, are trade
secrets belonging to Norvell. In this case, the state court ruled in favor of
Norvell and placed an injunction on Major, Angus, and Merkey from working
in a related industry for at least 9 months, ending 1.5 years after they left
Norvell.
The defendants were long time employees of Norvell Inc. All of the
defendants signed paperwork that prevents them from misappropriating trade
secrets. Together they worked on Norvell’s Wolf Mountain Project, which be-
gan in March 1995. During this time, Merkey told several Norvell coworkers
that he had intentionally under documented his work so that it would be “in
his head and not Norvell’s.”1 In late 1996 and early 1997, Wolf Mountain was
released internally to gather feedback from other Norvell computer engineers.
Since the Wolf Mountain Project received harsh criticism from the core op-
1Some quote him as also saying that when he left Novell he would take with him “the
crown jewels”, which they interpret to be the most sensitive technologies developed in Wolf
Mountain.
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erating group at Norvell, the project’s prospects at Norvell seemed dim. In
March and April 1997, Major, Angus, and Merkey resigned from Norvell to
start a new corporation, Timpanogos Research Group, which focused on ex-
ploring Wolf Mountain Project ideas outside of Norvell. In April 1997, Merkey
approached Microsoft, a Norvell competitor, to gauge their interest in the Wolf
Mountain Project.
In the end, the state court ruled in favor of Norvell. Since (1) Merkey,
Angus, and Major took Novell trade secrets with them to TRG, (2) the threat-
ened harm to Novell outweighted the potential damage to defendants and (3)
the proposed injunction was not adverse to the public interest, the judge de-
termined that an injunction was an appropriate remedy. The length of the
injunction was determined by the estimated time it would take to roll out a
completed product. For the defendants in this case, it was set to 9 months,
ending approximately 1.5 years after they left Norvell. During this time, they
were not allowed to use any of Norvell’s trade secrets or confidential techni-
cal information and would have to explicitly tell future employers about this
injunction.
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3.2
Data and Summary Statistics
3.2.1
Patent data
I use patent data from the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) patent data project, the Harvard Patent Database (Li et al., 2014),
and the patent data from Kogan et al. (2012) (henceforth KPSS). In a joint
effort, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and Hall
et al. (2001) (henceforth HJT) have collected data on over 3 million patents
and 16 million citations. The project has recently been updated to include
all patents granted from 1976-2006. For each patent, I observe the patent’s
technological category, application date, grant date, the list of cited patents,
and information about the patent’s assignees (i.e. owners). I use the Harvard
Patent Database and the KPSS patent data to supplement the NBER data.
It is well-documented that patenting (citing) propensities exhibit tremendous
heterogeneity across patent technology classes and through time HJT devel-
oped a structural approach and a reduced-form approach to adjust patent and
citation counts. In this paper, I follow related finance literature and employ
the reduced-form approach, adjusting for patent class propensities as suggested
by Seru (2014) and Lerner and Seru (2015). The procedure involves sorting
patents into 6 major technological classes. Citations are adjusted by dividing
by the average number of citations in each class - grant year. These adjusted
31
patents (citations) are then aggregated at the firm-year or firm-state year level,
creating a weighted sum of each firm’s patents.
Following the literature, I use the patent application year as the year
of record for a patent. HJT points out that there is, on average, a 2-year delay
between when a patent is applied for and when it is granted. To mitigate
concerns regarding truncation bias, I use the Harvard Patent Database, which
contains detailed information about patents granted through 2010. The last
patent application year of interest in our sample is 2006. This allows for four
additional years for patents to receive grant status and citations.
It is also difficult to precisely measure patent citations, which are also
subject to truncation bias (Lerner and Seru, 2015). Patent citations can ar-
rive up to 100 years in the future. HJT and Dass et al. (2015) claim that
having three to four years of additional data can drastically mitigate issues
with citation truncation. In line with this, I use the KPSS data, which has
patent citations that have been updated through 2012. This gives even the
last patents granted in our sample, those granted in 2010, at least three years
to accumulate citations. To further account for truncation, I adjust citations
per patent by the average number of citations received by patents in the same
category and grant year. In addition to these adjustments, I control for firm
and year variation in our statistical analysis.
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Firm State Patent Data
The Harvard Patent Database includes the name and state of residence
for patent inventors. This residence information allows me to attribute patents
to different state establishments for patenting firms. For each patent, I deter-
mine which state the assignees are from. If there are multiple states listed
on the patent, I give each state an equal portion of credit for the patent and
citations. Then, for each year, I take the sum of all patents a particular es-
tablishment applied for and calculate the total number of patents, citations,
and adjusted citations. If a firm-state has previously patented, but does not
patent in a given year, I assign 0 to its innovation measures.
Inventor Level Data
The Harvard Patent Database also provides additional information
about to track inventors as they patent. Li et al. (2014) implemented a Bay-
seian supervised learning approach to identify unique inventors in the data.
Since the USPTO only provides the name of the inventor and not a unique
inventor number, it can be difficult to match multiple patents to an inventor.
Li et al. (2014) use the full name of the inventor, the location of the inventor,
and the patent classification to match inventors who reappear in the data set.
They provide an unique inventor identifier that is generated by their learning
algorithm.
Using a similar methodology as Bernstein (2015), I try to determine
which inventors are new hires of the firm. I define a new hire as an inventor
33
who previously patented at a different firm and first patents at the affected
firm in a given year. To account for establishment size, which could vary by
patenting location, I scale the number of new hires each year by the total
number of inventors who have patented at that particular establishment in
the last 10 years.
3.2.2
Bureau of Labor Statistics Data
I use public data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to measure
industry level engineer and inventor employment. Each year the BLS surveys
companies and tracks the occupation make up of each industry. Using broad
occupation titles, I isolate engineering and science related occupations. For
each industry-year, I aggregate total engineer and scientist count and total
employee count. I classify an industry as High Tech if the industry engineer
employment percentage is double the average industry engineer employment
for that year (Hadlock et al., 1991; Hecker, 1999).
The BLS data begins in 1989 which limits the IDD adoption events I
am able to examine. Also, the BLS changed the way it defines industries from
sic codes to naics codes in 2002. Furthermore, the BLS switched from Office
of Employment Statistic employment codes to Census Occupation codes in
1998. These changes to industry definitions and occupation codes should not
have a large impact on the final results as they are only used to identify high
technology firms.
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3.2.3
Firm Financials
I collect firm financial information from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged
database from 1989 to 2006. Using the match provided by HJT, I match finan-
cial information to firms in my sample. In particular, I use several measures
of financial constraints including the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, the
Whited and Wu (2006), and the Size-Age Index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010).
I calculate the INV and RD as capital expenditures and research and de-
velopment spending scaled by total assets. Furthermore, I am able to match
financial variables that have previously been associated with firm innovation
such as Tobin Q, size, dividend dummy, fixed assets, cash holdings and return
on assets. All continuous variables are winzorized at the 1% level.
3.2.4
Summary Statistics
Summary statistics are provided in Table 3.3. Panel A of Table 3.3
shows the summary statistics only for firm locations impacted by the IDD
adoption. Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics for the primary
sample of the paper. This panel reports statistics for firm locations impacted
by the IDD adoption and also non-treated locations of the same firm. Panel
C of Table 3.3 shows firm level summary statistics for firms impacted by IDD
adoption and industry matched peers.
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3.3
Empirical Results
Motivated by theory, I examine how changes to the ease of departing
with knowledge will affect firm innovation and investment. As a shock to the
ability of employees to depart with knowledge, I use state adoption of IDD,
which increases trade secret protections. First, I compare the impact of IDD
when employee knowledge is high or low. Next, I test to see if these changes
are driven by firm investment. Then, I provide evidence that the firm is able
to attract better employees after IDD. Finally, I examine the impact when
states reject IDD and look for a reversal.
3.3.1
Innovation Outcomes
The main test of the paper is to study how shocks to the ability of
employees to depart with knowledge affect corporate innovation. In particular,
I look at state court rulings on the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD). When
a state court rules to adopt IDD, employee mobility decreases for high skill
workers (Klasa et al. (2015) and Png and Samila (2015)). In effect, firm
ownership over projects and innovation increases at the expense of employees.
This provides a natural setting to test the relationship between the allocation
of innovation returns and corporate innovation.
Proposition 1 argues that there should be a non-monotonic relationship
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between the employee’s outside options and total innovation. In particular,
when employee outside options are high, a decrease in the employee’s ability
to depart the firm can lead to increases in total innovation. To proxy for the
value of employee knowledge and inalienable human capital, I use the industry
concentration of engineers and scientists. High technology industries, which
employ more engineers and scientists, constantly improve their products to
keep up with customer and consumer demand.2 In these industries, new tech-
nologies rapidly replace existing products and methods. In lower technology
industries, such as the lumber and furniture industries, product lines are more
stable and are not often disrupted by new technologies. Thus, in high tech
industries, the ability of the employee to leverage their knowledge and create
new ideas is more valuable and more sought after and their inalienable human
capital is most valuable. Consistent with this notion, I use BLS data on occu-
pation statistics to identify high technology industries, which employ a high
percentage of engineers and scientists (Hadlock et al., 1991; Hecker, 1999).
In Figure 1, I compare the difference in response between high and
low technology industries to IDD adoption. Using innovation data from firm
establishments, i.e. state level innovation locations, I compare patent and
patent citations three years before and after IDD adoption. In the first graph, I
plot the average adjusted citations for low tech firms affected and unaffected by
IDD adoption around the IDD adoption event. For these establishments, there
2Bill Gates, the founder and former CEO of Microsoft, once said ”Intellectual property
has the shelf life of a banana.”
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is no difference before and after IDD adoption for either group. In the second
graph, I plot the average adjusted citations for high tech firm establishments
affected and unaffected by IDD adoption around the IDD adoption event.
Compared to the non-treated establishments, the treated locations experience
an increase in citations after IDD adoption. In the third graph, I compare
the difference between treated and non-treated locations for high and low tech
firms. It is clear that for the high tech locations, IDD increases citations. These
graphs provide initial evidence that a decrease in the employee’s allocation of
innovation returns can lead to increases in corporate innovation.
To formally test the difference between the groups, I use a regression
framework. To measure establishment level innovation output, I use the log of
the number of patents, citations and adjusted citations each year for a state
innovation location. First, I compare innovation outcomes in the three years
before to the three years after IDD adoption for affected establishments only.
This allows me to look at the overall effect of IDD adoption. Next, I compare
patent and patent citations between high and low tech establishments before
and after IDD adoption in a generalized difference-in-differences framework.
The regressions specifications are given below:
innovationi,t = β1Posti,t + γi + λt + i,t
innovationi,t = β1Posti,t + β2Hi Techi × Posti,t
+γi + λt + i,t
In both of these regressions, I include establishment and year fixed
effects to control for time invariant establishment characteristics and aggregate
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time varying changes. Additionally, I cluster these regressions at the firm level.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3.4 Panel A. Again,
my sample here are firm establishments affected by IDD adoption. In Columns
1-3, I compare innovation activity before and after IDD adoption. There is
no significant difference in innovation outcomes. In Columns 4-6, I compare
differences in innovation activity before and after IDD adoption between high
and low tech firms and find that high tech firms increase innovation after IDD
compared to low tech firms. Specifically, after IDD adoption, high tech firms
increase citations by 9.19% relative to low tech and unaffected locations. This
provides initial evidence in support of Proposition 1.
One potential concern is that establishments affected by IDD also ex-
perience a technology shock. To address this concern, I exploit the fact that
firms often innovate in multiple establishments across several states, and I
use the establishments that are not affected by IDD as natural controls for
any technology shocks. First, I compare the difference in innovation outcomes
in the three years before to the three years after IDD adoption for affected
establishments to unaffected establishments of the same firm. Second, I com-
pare patent and patent citations between high and low tech establishments
before and after IDD adoption across affected and unaffected locations in a
triple-differences framework. The regression specifications are given below:
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innovationi,s,t = β1IDDi,s × Posti,t + γi,s + λi,t + i,s,t
innovationi,s,t = β1IDDi,s × Posti,t + β2IDDi,s × Posti,t ×Hi Techi
+γi,s + λi,t + i,s,t
Again, in these regressions I am able to control for firm year level
variation and firm state differences. I cluster these regressions at the firm
level.
The regression results are presented in Panel B of Table ??. Again, in
Panel B Columns 1 - 3, I examine the impact of IDD adoption on innovation
comparing affected to unaffected locations pre- and post-IDD. Overall, there is
no real impact of IDD on these innovation outcomes. In Table 3.4 Columns 4
- 6, I examine the differential impact of IDD on high tech industries compared
to low tech industries and find that IDD adoption does have a positive effect
for high tech firms. In these high tech firms, the impact of IDD is positive
and significant. The firm state establishment that is affected will have about
9% more patents, 22% more citations, and 10% more adjusted citations. The
economic magnitudes of these coefficients are fairly large. A change in the IDD
law for High Tech firms is associated with a 10% relative to mean increase in
patents, citations, and adjusted citations.
These coefficients likely underestimate how IDD changes total innova-
tion. Since IDD strengthens trade secret protections by decreasing employee
mobility, the doctrine will also change the firm’s incentive to patent new in-
novations. Kim and Marschke (2005) argue that firms with high employee
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mobility prefer to use patents, not trade secrets, to better protect ideas from
employee expropriation. Therefore, IDD should have a negative impact on
patenting at high technology firms relative to low technology firms. Moreover,
since I document that high technology firms increase patenting relative to low
technology firms, the effect I identify on patented innovations is likely a lower
bound for the effect of IDD on total innovation.
Another concern is that firms that will benefit the most from IDD
adoption spearhead the effort to bring cases before state courts. To address
this concern, I remove firms in the same 2-digit SIC code as the industry
that is directly involved in that state’s IDD court case. This further limits
my sample. I re-run the results on this smaller sample. The coefficients are
given in Table 3.4 Panel C. The coefficients are still positive and significant
for the high tech firms around IDD adoption. Moreover, the magnitude of
the coefficients remains similar across the three specifications which provides
additional proof that effect cannot be explained away by additional controls.
This analysis differs from and improves on previous studies that looked
at investment and innovation response to non-compete laws. First, trade secret
laws are applied more widely than non-competes and often are a precursor to
non-compete enforcement. Every employee at a company signs an agreement,
which makes them liable for misappropriation of trade secrets, and any dif-
ferences in the enforcement of trade secret misappropriation come from state
court decisions like adopting IDD. Second, I am able to compare differences
within firm across states, which allows me to account for firm level technol-
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ogy shocks or difference in firm spending. Previous studies mostly compared
different companies in the same industry that are affected by changes to non-
compete enforcement. These studies have a harder time accounting for com-
pany differences in those states. By comparing establishments within a firm,
the policies toward innovation and technological development should be more
standardized.
3.3.2
Synthetic Controls and Placebo Tests
This analysis assumes that other state level factors are constant around
the state court’s adoption of IDD. However, the state court might decide to
adopt IDD as the state is trying other incentives to promote company invest-
ment and overall innovation in certain sectors. I address this concern in two
ways. First, I run a Placebo Test to see if smaller, private firms that I think
will be unaffected by IDD exhibit the same changes in innovation. Second, I
use smaller, private firms as a synthetic control to account for state changes to-
ward innovation policy that are unrelated to firm-employee incentives (Abadie
et al., 2012).
First, I replicate the patenting behavior of firms that face the same
state level changes, but do not respond to the differences in firm-employee
incentives. In general, smaller firms and independent innovators that are not
employed by large companies should not be impacted by IDD. In these private
firms, each inventor and employee is more likely to own an equity stake in
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the company which reduces the chance of misaligned incentives. However,
these firms should still be impacted by the same state level changes which
might influence innovation such as banking deregulation (Amore et al. (2013),
Chava et al. (2013), and Cornaggia et al. (2015)) and wrongful discharge laws
(Acharya et al., 2014).
To replicate the innovation behavior of each establishment affected by
the adoption of IDD, I follow a multi-step procedure. First, I take all patents
not matched to compustat firms and aggregate the total number of patents
and citations by state, patent category, and application year. Next, I measure
patent category intensity for each firm establishment that is affected by IDD
adoption. Finally, I replicate the firm establishment by taking a weighted
sum of patent citations for each year around the IDD event using the firm’s
patenting intensity in each category as the weights.
I rerun the triple-differences result in Table 3.4 Panel B by substituting
the innovation outcomes of establishments affected by IDD. This is a placebo
test where the difference between high and low tech firms should no longer
be significant. The results of the regression are presented in Table 3.5 Panel
A. In Columns 1 - 3, I find that the impact of IDD is positive. That means
for firms in states that adopted IDD there is an impact on overall innovation
that is associated with IDD adoption. However, in Columns 4 - 6, the impact
of IDD adoption on innovation measures is not different for low tech firms.
Therefore, this placebo test shows that a state’s friendliness to innovation and
technology development is correlated with state courts adopting IDD laws, but
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cannot explain the difference between high and low technology firms.
Next, I verify that the actual establishments affected by IDD still ex-
hibit increases in innovation above their synthetic controls. In particular, I
run a triple difference regression where I compare establishments pre- and
post- IDD adoption, between high and low technology firms, across real and
synthetic observations. The results of the regression are presented in Table
3.5 Panel B. In Columns 1 - 3, I find that there is a decline in innovation
overall after IDD compared to the synthetic control group. In Columns 4-6,
I find that high tech locations experience an increase compared to low tech
establishments. Thus, these results support the notion that these changes to
employee mobility and investment incentives have a positive impact on high
technology firms beyond any state differences.
3.3.3
Firm Investment
The main emphasis of this paper is that firm investment and employee
effort decisions are intertwined. When employees become less able to depart
with valuable knowledge, it affects both firm investment and employee effort.
Corollaries 1 and 2 come from the insight that firm investment must increase
if corporate innovation increases after decreasing employee allocation of inno-
vation returns.
To test Corollary 1, I examine firm spending on research and develop-
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ment (RD). In order to confirm Corollary 1, I expect that high tech firms
increase investment after IDD adoption relative to unaffected peers and rela-
tive to low tech firms. Using only the firms that I can identify in the patent
data set, I compare the level of RD and investment spending to industry peers
in the 3 years around IDD adoption. I run the following regression:
investmenti,t = β1IDDi × Postt + β2IDDi × Posti,t ×Hi Techi
+γ ∗Xi,t + λi + µt + i,t
The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 3.6. In Column 1, I
only include the IDD adoption indicator. I find that IDD adoption does not
significantly impact investment. This confirms the result in Klasa et al. (2015),
who look at firm leverage around IDD adoption and do not find increases in
investment spending. In Column 2, I add the interaction term to compare
investment differences between high tech firms. I find that high tech firms
invest more after IDD relative to low technology firms and unaffected industry
peers. In Column 3, I add in additional firm controls that have been used to
explain investment and innovation and the result holds. Together this provides
evidence that firms in the high tech area are likely to invest more after trade
secrets become better protected. This is consistent with Png (2015), who
studies firm investment around state adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act.
To test Corollary 2, I look at innovation outcomes for firms that are
financially constrained and unconstrained. Corollary 2 asserts that if invest-
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ment is fixed then decreasing employee allocation cannot lead to increases
in innovation. Therefore, firms that are likely financially constrained should
have a harder increasing investment after IDD adoption and will not increase
innovation.
In Table 3.7, I present the same triple difference regression specification
as in Table 3.4 Panel B split by different measures of financial constraints –
leverage, KZ, WW and SA. In each panel of Table 7, the positive and significant
coefficients are present only in the firms that are likely unconstrained. These
firms should be able to easily finance additional innovation investment by
using internal cash flows or accessing bank lending. In firms that are likely
constrained, there is a small, insignificant increase in innovation, which could
be due to firms experiencing a slight relaxation of financing constraints caused
by increased pledgeability of intangible assets (Klasa et al. (2015) and Mann
(2015)).
3.3.4
Employee Hiring
One benefit of the patent data is the ability to identify individual in-
ventors. Using the inventor matches provided by Li et al. (2014), I can identify
when an employee joins a new firm. Consistent with the literature, I define a
new hire as an inventor who previously patented at a different firm then ap-
plied for a patent at the target firm (Bernstein, 2015). Furthermore, I measure
the quality of a new inventor by checking if the inventor has a patent which
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ranked in the top 10 of citations compared to the patent’s category-year cohort.
Together this will let me test Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 states that, when employees can easily depart with knowl-
edge, there will be a negative assortative match between employee quality and
employee ability to depart. To test this, I examine new hires at different firm
establishments and compare the difference between high and low technology
establishments. Using the same methodology as Table 3.4 Panel B, I compare
ability to hire new inventors before and after IDD adoption across affected and
unaffected establishments between high and low technology firms. Specifically,
I run the following regression:
newi,s,t = β1IDDi,s × Posti,t + β2IDDi,s × Posti,t ×Hi Techi
+γi,s + λi,t + i,s,t,
where new(new10, not10) is the number of new (high quality, low qual-
ity) hires in a state s of firm i in year t as a fraction of inventors in the 5 years
before IDD adoption.
The results of the regression are presented in Table 3.8. In Columns
1 and 2, the dependent variable is all new hires. There is a slight increase in
new hires by high tech firms, but it is not significant. In Columns 3 and 4, the
dependent variable is high quality new hires. After IDD adoption, high tech
firms are able to hire 2.45% more high quality new hires per year compared
to low tech firms and unaffected firm locations. This result is economically
significant since the average a location only hires 1.17% high quality inventors
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a year. In Columns 5 and 6, the dependent variable is low quality new hires.
Again the results are insignificant.
These results confirm Proposition 2–that decreasing the employee’s
ability to depart the firm will allow firms to hire better inventors. Intuitively,
before the IDD, firm investment is low and high quality inventors would have
better opportunities elsewhere. However, after IDD, the firm can commit to a
large increase in investment anticipating the employee will provide more effort.
This will increase the expected utility of the higher quality employees more
leading to the firm to match with better employees.
3.4
Conclusion
The results of this paper are relevant to understanding the relation-
ship between human capital and firm investment. This is relationship is will
become even more important to the economy in the Information Age. When
evaluating policies related to human capital and firm investment, it is impor-
tant to consider the impact on both investing parties. Focusing only on one
side will give an incomplete picture of the policy impact. This paper shows
the counter intuitive result that decreasing the employee’s ability to depart
with valuable knowledge can lead to better overall outcomes for the firm.
The results of this paper are relevant to policy makers who are trying
to increase innovation spending by firms while also providing labor protection
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for employees. This paper would recommend policy makers take a wholistic
approach to incentivizing innovation by considering firm and employee deci-
sions in tandem. This paper also provides insights for future trade secret and
employee protection laws, such as the Defend Trade Secrets Act (S. 1890, H.R.
3326). For high tech industries, increasing trade secret protections should have
a positive effect on innovation and investment. However, this paper does not
speak to the impact of trade secret protection on other employees in the wider
economy.
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Figure 3.1: Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Adoption
(A) State Court IDD adoptions from 1989 - 2000
(B) State with IDD prior to 1989
These figures map IDD adoption events across the United States. In Panel A,
states that adopt IDD between 1989 and 2000 are colored dark red. These are
the IDD shcoks I use in my paper. In Panel B, states that have adopted IDD
before 1989 are colored dark blue. I plot these states to show the full slate of
states that have adopted IDD.
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Figure 3.2: Inevitable Disclosure Triple Differences
(A) (B)
(C)
This figure graphics displays the impact of IDD on adjusted citations for high and low tech
industries. I regress year dummies interacted with IDD treatment and firm technology level
on firm innovation measured by the natural logarithm of adjusted citations. I include firm-
year fixed effects in these regressions. I adjust these coefficients by setting the year prior to
IDD adoption to 0. There are four main categories of establishments IDD and high tech,
IDD and low tech, no IDD and high tech, and no IDD and low tech.
Panel A plots the difference between treated and untreated establishments before and after
IDD for low tech firms. Panel B does the same for high technology firms. Panel C compares
the differences between these two groups.
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Table 3.1: Summary of State Stances on Inevitable Disclosure
State Court Adoptions
State Primary Case(s) Year Industry (2D-SIC)
Arkansas Southwestern Energy Co v. Eickenhorst 1997 13
Connecticut Branson Ultrasonics Corp v. Stratman 1996 28
Deleware
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
American Potash & Chemical Corp.
1964
Florida Fountain v Hudson Cush-N-Foam Corp. 1960
Georgia Essex Group, Inc, v. Southwire Co 1998 36
Illinois
Teradyne, Inc. v. Clear Communications
Corp.
1989 38
Indiana Ackerman v. Kimball International, Inc. 1995 36
Iowa Uncle B’s Bakery, Inc. v. O’Rouke 1996 20
Kansas Bradbury CO. V Teissier-DuCros 2006 34
Massachusetts Marcam Corp. v. Orchard 1995 15
Michigan
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Cont’l
Aviation & Engineering Corp.
2002
Minnesota Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc. 1986
Missouri
H& R Block Eastern Tax Services, Inc.
v. Enchura
2000 64
New Jersey
National Starch & Chemical Corp. v.
Parker Chemical Corp.
1987 28
New York
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Powers Film
Prod.
1919 38
North Carolina Travenol Labs., Inc v Turner 1976
Ohio Procter & Gamble Co., v. Stoneham 2000 28
Pennsylvania
Air Products & Chemical, Inc. v.
Johnson
1982
Texas
Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems,
Inc.
1993 87
Utah
Norvell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research
Group, Inc.
1998 87
Washington Solutec Corp Inc. v. Agnew 1997 20
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Table 3.2: High Engineer and Scientist Industries
2 Digit SIC Industry pct engineeers
10 Metal, Mining 7.9
13 Oil & Gas Extraction 11.6
21 Tobacco Products 8.3
28 Chemical & Allied Products 12.5
29 Petroleum & Coal Products 11.5
35 Industrial Machinery & Equipment 12.0
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 15.2
37 Transportation Equipment 15.2
38 Instruments & Related Products 20.2
46 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas 12.1
49 Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 10.9
87 Engineering & Management Services 22.5
89 Services (Unclassified) 24.5
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics
Panel A: ALL IDD Firms Locations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES N mean sd p10 p50 p90
Hi Tech 7,920 0.508 0.500 0 1 1
log(patents+1) 7,920 0.939 1.121 0 0.693 2.565
log(cites+1) 7,920 2.092 2.209 0 1.792 5.268
log(adj cites+1) 7,920 0.928 1.218 0 0.378 2.792
Panel B: All Firm Locations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES N mean sd p10 p50 p90
log(patents+1) 33,420 0.950 1.206 0 0.693 2.708
log(cites+1) 33,420 2.106 2.315 0 1.609 5.412
log(adj cites+1) 33,420 0.934 1.288 0 0.285 2.832
Hi Tech 33,420 0.573 0.495 0 1 1
IDD 33,420 0.112 0.316 0 0 1
New Hire 33,420 0.0422 0.176 0 0 0.0769
Top New Hire 33,420 0.0177 0.110 0 0 0.0103
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Table 3.4: Inevitable Disclosure and Innovation
Estimates are reported for Difference-in-Differences and Triple Difference regression
specifications using state adoption of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine as a treatment
event. I use three years of data both pre- and Post-. In Panels B and C, I
compare establishments affected by IDD to establishments of the same firm that
are unaffected. The final difference comes from high and low tech industries which
I split using BLS OES data on occupation. The main variables of interest are
the natural logs of the number of patents, citations, and adjusted citations which
are applied for in a given year (and eventually granted). In Panel A, I focus on
firm locations that are in states that adopt IDD and compare the effects between
high and low tech firms. In Panel B, I add in non-treated establishments of firms
locations that are impacted by IDD. In Panel C, I remove firms in industries which
are directly mentioned in the lawsuits. In Columns 1 - 3 of each panel, I compare
innovation before and after IDD passes. In Columns 4-6, I compare the differences
between firms in high and low tech industries. All specifications have firm-state
fixed effects and year or firm-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Panel A: Overall Effects of IDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
Post 0.0242 0.0669 0.0364 -0.0222 -0.0129 -0.0129
(0.0231) (0.0616) (0.0283) (0.0268) (0.0704) (0.0337)
Post × Hi Tech 0.0866*** 0.149** 0.0919***
(0.0290) (0.0662) (0.0327)
Observations 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920 7,920
Adjusted R-squared 0.791 0.659 0.749 0.792 0.659 0.749
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Panel B: Within Firm Effect of IDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
IDD × Post 0.00908 0.0264 0.0298 -0.0432 -0.0918 -0.0285
(0.0258) (0.0580) (0.0268) (0.0375) (0.0779) (0.0369)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0935* 0.211** 0.104**
(0.0497) (0.107) (0.0518)
Observations 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.847 0.723 0.817 0.847 0.723 0.817
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
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Panel C: Within Firm Removing Industries Involved in IDD cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
IDD × Post 0.00578 0.0129 0.0283 -0.0416 -0.0922 -0.0267
(0.0275) (0.0641) (0.0299) (0.0378) (0.0786) (0.0372)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0907* 0.201* 0.105*
(0.0527) (0.119) (0.0584)
Observations 30,816 30,816 30,816 30,816 30,816 30,816
Adjusted R-squared 0.847 0.724 0.817 0.847 0.724 0.817
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
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Table 3.5: Placebo Test and Synthetic Control
Estimates are reported for Triple Difference specifications using state adoption of
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine as a treatment event. I use three years of data both
pre- and Post-. I compare establishments affected by IDD to establishments of the
same firm that are unaffected. The final difference comes from high and low tech
industries which I split using BLS OES data on occupation. The main variables
of interest are the natural logs of the number of patents, citations, and adjusted
citations which are applied for in a given year (and eventually granted). For each
firm location affected by IDD adoption, I replace the innovation variables with the
state level innovation weighted by the firm location’s patenting characteristics. In
Columns 1 - 3, I compare innovation before and after IDD passes. In Columns 4-6,
I compare the differences between firms in high and low tech industries. All speci-
fications have firm-state fixed effects and year or firm-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses below coefficient
estimates.
Panel A: Placebo Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
IDD × Post 0.0901*** -0.0107 0.0827*** 0.0830*** -0.00318 0.0922***
(0.0175) (0.0342) (0.0206) (0.0256) (0.0471) (0.0293)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0127 -0.0134 -0.0171
(0.0360) (0.0684) (0.0409)
Observations 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.956 0.869 0.945 0.956 0.869 0.945
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
Panel B: Synthetic Control
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
Real × Post -0.0846*** 0.0173 -0.0689*** -0.201*** -0.127 -0.173***
(0.0221) (0.0504) (0.0251) (0.0440) (0.0800) (0.0468)
Real × Post × Hi Tech 0.210*** 0.259** 0.188***
(0.0696) (0.116) (0.0726)
Observations 7,512 7,512 7,512 7,512 7,512 7,512
Adjusted R-squared 0.948 0.893 0.941 0.948 0.893 0.941
Firm-State-Year FE X X X X X X
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Table 3.7: IDD and Financial Constraints
Estimates are reported for Triple Difference regression specifications using state
adoption of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine as a treatment event. I use three years
of data both pre- and Post- and compare establishments affected by IDD to es-
tablishments of the same firm that are unaffected. The final difference comes from
high and low tech industries which I split using BLS OES data on occupation.
The main variables of interest are the natural logs of the number of patents, cita-
tions, and adjusted citations which are applied for in a given year (and eventually
granted). In Panel A, split the sample based on leverage. In Panel B, split the
sample based on the KZ index. In Panel C, split the sample based on the WW
index. In Panel D, split the sample based on SA index. In Columns 1 - 3 of each
panel, report coefficient estimates for constrained firms. In Columns 4-6, report
coefficient estimates for unconstrained firms.. All specifications have firm-state
fixed effects and year or firm-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.
Panel A: Firms split by Leverage
High Lev Low Lev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
IDD × Post -0.0244 -0.0844 -0.00836 -0.0566 -0.113 -0.0463
(0.0683) (0.126) (0.0642) (0.0441) (0.104) (0.0470)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0355 0.130 0.0438 0.138** 0.309** 0.155**
(0.0810) (0.158) (0.0800) (0.0646) (0.155) (0.0717)
Observations 15,582 15,582 15,582 17,466 17,466 17,466
Adjusted R-squared 0.854 0.731 0.824 0.861 0.730 0.832
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
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Panel B: Firms split by KZ
High KZ Low KZ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
IDD × Post -0.0711 -0.151 -0.0598 -0.0284 -0.0604 -0.0119
(0.0701) (0.131) (0.0677) (0.0421) (0.0975) (0.0456)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0807 0.145 0.0672 0.109* 0.274** 0.139**
(0.0841) (0.170) (0.0868) (0.0601) (0.139) (0.0655)
Observations 13,560 13,560 13,560 19,860 19,860 19,860
Adjusted R-squared 0.828 0.714 0.798 0.857 0.727 0.826
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
Panel C: Firms split by WW
High WW Low WW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
IDD × Post -0.0302 -0.0399 -0.0117 -0.0367 -0.131 -0.0179
(0.0476) (0.103) (0.0503) (0.0558) (0.125) (0.0568)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0476 0.0214 0.0486 0.151** 0.439*** 0.155**
(0.0658) (0.148) (0.0720) (0.0759) (0.160) (0.0738)
Observations 16,553 16,553 16,553 16,867 16,867 16,867
Adjusted R-squared 0.810 0.687 0.777 0.871 0.749 0.842
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
Panel D: Firms split by SA
High SA Low SA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
patents citations adj citations patents citations adj citations
IDD × Post -0.0649 -0.140 -0.0511 -0.0330 -0.0816 -0.0212
(0.0718) (0.134) (0.0689) (0.0423) (0.100) (0.0465)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0689 0.133 0.0558 0.110* 0.297** 0.143**
(0.0853) (0.173) (0.0877) (0.0607) (0.141) (0.0662)
Observations 13,494 13,494 13,494 19,554 19,554 19,554
Adjusted R-squared 0.839 0.720 0.808 0.868 0.736 0.839
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
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Table 3.6: IDD and Financial Investment
Estimates are reported for Triple Difference specifications using state adoption of
Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine as a treatment event. I use three years of data both
pre- and Post-. I compare firms affected by IDD to firms in the same industry
that are unaffected. The final difference comes from high and low tech industries
which I split using BLS OES data on occupation. The main variables of interest
are research and development spending and capital expenditures divided by assets.
In Columns 1 - 3, the main variables of interest are research and development
spending divided by assets . In Columns 4-6, the main variables of interest are
research and development spending and capital expenditures divided by assets. In
Columns 3 and 6, I use TobinsQ, ln(Size), Dividend, ROA, Leverage, Cash, WW,
and HHI as controls. All specifications have firm and year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses below coefficient
estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RD RD RD INV INV INV
IDD × Post -0.00164 -0.00457 -0.00400 0.00120 -0.00265 -0.00227
(0.00210) (0.00285) (0.00245) (0.00205) (0.00207) (0.00207)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.00602* 0.00737** 0.00810** 0.00730*
(0.00349) (0.00365) (0.00398) (0.00435)
TobinQ 0.00370*** 0.00227***
(0.000609) (0.000342)
Ln(Size) -0.0270*** 0.00426***
(0.00202) (0.00126)
Dividend -0.000424 0.00318*
(0.00197) (0.00171)
ROA -0.178*** -0.0144***
(0.00893) (0.00411)
Leverage -0.0162*** -0.0374***
(0.00613) (0.00569)
Cash -0.0686*** -0.0646***
(0.00643) (0.00453)
WW -0.00531 -0.0210*
(0.0162) (0.0110)
HHI -0.104** -0.0698**
(0.0447) (0.0342)
Observations 54,756 54,720 54,720 54,756 54,720 54,720
Adjusted R-squared 0.785 0.785 0.846 0.505 0.506 0.522
Firm FE X X X X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
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Table 3.8: IDD and Firm New Hires
Estimates are reported for Triple Difference regression specifications using state
adoption of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine as a treatment event. I use three years
of data both pre- and Post- and compare establishments affected by IDD to es-
tablishments of the same firm that are unaffected. The final difference comes from
high and low tech industries which I split using BLS OES data on occupation.
In Columns 1 and 2, the main variable of interest is the number of new hires as
a fraction of patenting employees in the 5 years before IDD adoption at the firm
location. In Columns 3 and 4, the main variable of interest is the number of new
hires who have a previous top 10 patent as a fraction of patenting employees in the
5 years before IDD adoption at the firm location. In Columns 5 and 6, the main
variable of interest is the number of new hires who do not have a top 10 patnet as
a fraction of patenting employees in the 5 years before IDD adoption at the firm
location. All specifications have firm-state fixed effects and year or firm-year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses
below coefficient estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
new new top10 top10 no top10 no top10
IDD × Post -0.00130 -0.0117 0.00663 -0.00709 -0.00793* -0.00464
(0.00700) (0.00819) (0.00594) (0.00522) (0.00469) (0.00614)
IDD × Post × Hi Tech 0.0187 0.0245** -0.00588
(0.0132) (0.0111) (0.00899)
Observations 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420 33,420
Adjusted R-squared 0.185 0.185 0.129 0.129 0.115 0.114
Firm-State FE X X X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X X X
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Appendix A
Model Proofs
A.1
Employee Outside Option and Total Innovation
The equation for the total expected innovation is given in equation (7). From this,
I can take the total derivative with respect to δ, the employee’s outside option to see how
total innovation will behave.
dR∗
dδ
= (2α(1− δ)δ) 2α1−2α + δ(2α(1− δ)δ)
2α
1−2α−1(2α)(2α(1− 2δ))
1− 2α
∝
(
1− δ + (2α)(1− 2δ)
1− 2α
) (A.1)
To understand the behavior of the derivative, all I need to do is focus on the simpler
expression. Hence, I can set the expression equal to zero and determine what the critical
value for δ.
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0 =
(
1− δ + (2α)(1− 2δ)
1− 2α
)
δ =
1
1 + 2α
(A.2)
It is clear that the expression is decreasing in α. Thus dER
∗
dδ > 0 when δ < δ and
dER∗
dδ < 0 when δ > δ.
A.2
Firm Investment
To prove Corollary 1, I need to determine the impact of δ on firm invest. Therefore,
I need to take the total derivative of expected innovation with respect to δ.
dI∗
dδ
= (2α(1− δ)δ) 11−2α−1 1
1− 2α (2α(1− 2δ)) (A.3)
The first two terms of the derivative, (2α(1−δ)δ) 11−2α−1 11−2α will always be positive.
If δ > δ, then the last term is will be negative because 1 − 2δ < 0. Thus, when employee
outside option decrease, firm investment will increase in this region.
To prove Corollary 2, I need to determine the impact of δ on innovation holding
investment fixed.
d
dδ
R(e, I) =
d
dδ
δI
a+1
= I
a+1
(A.4)
Therefore, it is clear that total innovation will decrease if employee outside options
decrease and and investment is held constant.
64
A.3
Employee Matching
With heterogenous employee skill, I assume that employee there are differences in
costs of effort. Specifically, employee with skill c will have disutility of effort of e
2
2c . Given
this cost of effort I can solve for the employee’s utility in equilibrium.
First, employee effort will be e(I) = cδIα. Next, firm investment in the project
will be I∗ = (2αcδ(1 − δ)) 11−2α . Thus, I can solve for employee utility and I will get
Uemp(c, δ) =
e2
2c =
cδ2
2 (2αcδ(1− δ))
2α
1−2α .
A sufficient condition for assortative matching is to prove supermodularity of em-
ployee utility with respect to disutility of effort and employee outside options. It is obvious
that employee utility is an increasing in e√
c
. Thus, I will show that this is supermodular.
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Appendix B
Additional Figures
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Figure B.1: Inevitable Disclosure Triple Differences - Patents
(A) (B)
(C)
This figure graphics displays the impact of IDD on patents for high and low tech industries.
I regress year dummies interacted with IDD treatment and firm technology level on firm
innovation measured by the natural logarithm of adjusted citations. I include firm-year
fixed effects in these regressions. I adjust these coefficients by setting the year prior to IDD
adoption to 0. There are four main categories of establishments IDD and high tech, IDD
and low tech, no IDD and high tech, and no IDD and low tech.
Panel A plots the difference between treated and untreated establishments before and after
IDD for low tech firms. Panel B does the same for high technology firms. Panel C compares
the differences between these two groups.
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Figure B.2: Inevitable Disclosure Triple Differences - Citations
(A) (B)
(C)
This figure graphics displays the impact of IDD on citations for high and low tech industries.
I regress year dummies interacted with IDD treatment and firm technology level on firm
innovation measured by the natural logarithm of adjusted citations. I include firm-year
fixed effects in these regressions. I adjust these coefficients by setting the year prior to IDD
adoption to 0. There are four main categories of establishments IDD and high tech, IDD
and low tech, no IDD and high tech, and no IDD and low tech.
Panel A plots the difference between treated and untreated establishments before and after
IDD for low tech firms. Panel B does the same for high technology firms. Panel C compares
the differences between these two groups.
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